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A.bstract:
I  derive  conditions  under  which  the  monetary  authority  should  target
nominal  spending.  The  relevant  spending  target  is  a  weighted  average  of
income  and  consumption.  Despite  'stickyu  nominal  wages,  under  optimal  policy
the  economy  behaves  as  if  all  markets  clear.
----------FInn-E&an-A 
and  Mark  wynne  offered  heLpful  conrments  on  an  earlJ.er
version  of  this  paper.  Neither  they,  the  Federal-  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas,  nor
the  Federal  Reserve  System  necessarily  share  the  views  expressed  here.There  is  little  agreement  on  how  the  Federal  Reserve  ought  to  allow
prices  to  respond  to  near-term  changes  in  real  economic  actj-viby,  Some
analysts  lrou1d  have  the  Federal  Reserve  maintain  a  constant  price  level  (Barro
1985).  Other  anaLysts  have  advocated  policy  rules  that  mandate  short-run
departures  from  zero  inflation  in  response  to  unusually  slorr  or  unusually
rapid  output  growth,  or  in  response  to  deviations  of  output  away  from  trend
(Hall  1984,  Mccallum  1984 and  1988,  Taylor  1985).
Bean  (1983)  addresses  the  shorE-run  stabilization  issue  in  the  conrexE
of  an  economy  with  a  predetermined  nominal  wage.  He  demonstrates  that  outpuL
is  too  sensitive  to  aggregate  productivity  shocks  in  sucb  an  economy  unless
the  monetary  authority  allows  the  price  level  to  vary  inversely  with  output.
In  the  special  case  where  the  supply  of  labor  is  perfectly  inelastic  with
respect  to  the  real  rdage,  Lhe  monetary  authority  can  optimally  stabilize
output  by  targeting  nominal  income,
A  key  simplifying  assumption  in  Bean's  analysis  is  that  the  supply  of
Iabor  is  independent  of  household  wealth.  I  show  that  relaxing  this  assump-
tion  has  two  important  policy  implicat'j.ons.  First,  a  nominal  spending  larget
is  no  longer  optimal  when  the  supply  of  labor  is  perfectly  inelastic.  Instead,
a  nominal  spending  target  is  optimal  in  the  much more  realistic  case  in  which
the  h'eaIth  and  substsituEion  effects  of  an  aggregate  productlvity  shock  offset
one  another.  Second,  the  monetary  authority  should  target  not  nominal  income
but,  raEher,  a  geometrj-c  average  of  nominal  income  and  nominal  consumption.
Insofar  as  the  monetary  authority  successfully  implemenbs  the  optimal
rule,  the  economy  will  behave  exactly  as  predicted  by  a  standard  real  business
cycle  model.  An  implication  is  that  the  fraction  of  output  variation  that  can
be  explained  by  aggregate  productivity  shocks  may  say  less  about  the
importance  or  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  than  it  does  about  how  well  the
Federal  Reserve  has  been  doinq  its  iob.
Aggregale  Supply  in  a  Harket,  - Clearing  Econo[E
The  representative  competitive  firm  wilt  equaEe  labor,s  marginal  productto  the  real  wage.  If  output  is  produced  according  to
where  y  is  real  output,  tI  is  hours  of  work,  o  <  p  <  1  is  a  fixed  parameter,
and  e  is  a  random  productivity  shock,  it  follows  that
y = eNr-P/(,  -  p),
0 -  Pn = w -  p,




where  fower-case  let.ters  denote  the  logs  of  their  upper-case  counterparLs.
Under  perfect  competition,  the  representative  household  will  equate
minus  the  marginal  rate  of  substitutior  betvreen  labor  and  consumption  to  the
real  wage.  If  the  representative  household's  utility  function  takes  the  form
u(c,  N)  =  (c9-  -  1) / (L  -  cl') -  N1.r/ (1  +  l)  ,
where  C is  real  consumption  and  e  >  0  and  L  >  0  are  fixed  parameters,  then
),n+oc=w-p.  (3)
The  supply  of  labor  is  positively  relatsed  to  the  real  wage  and  inversely
related  to  consumption.
Finally,  bake  the  logarithm  of  equation  1:
and  1et
(4)
denote  the  fractsion  of  output  that  is  unavailable  to  households.  For  now,  thereader  may wish  to  think  of  9  as  measuring  the  fraction  of  output  consumed  by
the  fiscal  authority.  In  general,  9  will  have  a  random  component -  Moreover,
this  component  may be  correlaLed  with  d.
The  narket-clearing  values  of  output,  consumptio[,  the  real  wage,  and
labor  are  obtained  by  sirnultaneously  solving  equations  !',  2,  3,  alf,d 4r
v'=l d + B(1-d)  + r,I t(1+1)0  + c(1-F)e -  (p+,1.1]n(1-p)l (s)
c + p(1-a)  + i,I t(r+.1.)0  -  (p*l)s  -  (B+l)ln(1-p)l  (5)
(w  - p1  . = 1s + p  (1-a  ) , ,'I l(a+i,)0 - aFs - dpln(1-p)l
1  11r-a)0 + ug + dln(1-P) I .
(7)
{U,,
a + B(r-c)  + l,
A  positive  productivity  shock  wi.1l  raise  equitibrj-um  output,  equilibrium
consumption,  and  the  equilibrium  real  wage  for  any  given  value  of  g.  The
impact  on  equilibrium  hours  is  ambiguous,  due  to  opposing  \,realth  and  substi-
tution  effects.  When a  =  1,  equilibrium  hours  of  work  are  independent  of  0.
If  the  fraction,  g,  of  output  that  is  denied  to  consumers  rises,  the
representative  household,  feeling  h'orse  off,  will  cut  back  on  both  consumptj-on
and  Leisure.  Households'  increased  willingness  to  work  is  reflected  in  a
lower  equilibrj,um  real  wage  and  increased  equilibrium  output.
Aggregat€  Supply  wlth  a  Pr€-DeE€rmin€d  Money  vfag€
If  relocation  costs  are  negligible  when  workers  switch  jobs  one  period
in  advance  and  prohibitive  otherwise,  then  the  labor  market  will  be
competj-tive  ex  ante  and  monopsonistic  ex  post.  Workers  will  insist  that  some
of  the  terms  of  their  employment  be  spelled  out  in  advance,  In  practice,  iE
is  often  the  money  wage  that  is  predetermined.  Flexibility  is  preserved  by
giving  firms  control  of  hours.  For  supporting  empirical  evidence,  see  Card(1990) ,  Cho and  Cooley  (1992) ,  Cho  (1993) ,  and Mclaughlin  (1994) .
Assume  that  the  money  wage  is  specified  one  period  in  advance.  More-
over,  consistent  with  the  existing  literature,  assume  the  wage  is  fixed  at  its
expected  market-clearing  1eve1 ,  Equatians  L',  2,  and  4  then  imply
y -  y. =  r#,  (p  -  p"). r;;Offif;fr rrfl  (o  - 0.)  - a(g  - s")t,
(9)
where  an  're"  superscript  indicates  an  expected  value  conditional  upon
information  available  in  the  immediately  preceding  period.  Intuitively,  firms
respond  to  unanticipated  shocks  as  if  the  labor  supply  schedule  is  horizontal
at.  the  predetermined  wage,  As  a  result,  emplol.ment  and  output  respond  too
strongly  to  unanticipated  shifts  in  labor  demand  (due  to  unanticipated  changes
in  p  or  d),  and  do  not  respond  sirongly  enough  to  unantj.cipated  shifts  in
labor  supply  (due  to  unanticipated  changes  in  gr).
OptiEal  Pollcy
Since  competitive  equilibria  are  efficient,  the  monetary  authorily
should  seek  a  policy  that  achieves  a  compelitive  allocation.  I  claim  that  the
sticky-wage  economy  will  achieve  exactly  ttre  same allocation  as  the  market-
clearing  economy  provided  that  the  monetary  authoriby  implements  a  policy  rule
of  the  form  pr  +  Aer  +  ByE =  T  where  1'r is  an  arbitrary  pre-announced  targ:et
and  A  and  B  are  fixed  parameEers.l  If  d  =  L,  then  A  +  B  =  l  and  the  policy
rule  can be  rewrilten  as A(F)  + c)  .  +  (t  -  A)(p+  y\r=  Tr.  Thats  is,  ifa  = r
the  monetary  authority  should  target  a  geometric  weighted  average  of  nominal
consumption  and  nominal  income.
'fo  see  that  the  proposed  rule  is  opt j-mal,  begin  by  noting  that  lhe  rute
implies  that  pr  -  AgE +  (A  +  B)yr  = 
"r. 
since  the  target,  ?r,  is  announced  at
leas!  one  period  in  advance,  it  follows  that  (p  -  p.).  = l(9|  -  9f) .  -  (A  +  B) (y
-  lF).  or,  equivatentfy,  that  (p  -  p.).  = A(9  -  gf).  -  (A + B) l(y  -  l).  +  (1  -
1F).1 .  Using  the  latter  expression  to  eliminate  (p  -  p") 
" 
from  equation  9:r  1-F  rr ' p*  (A*a)  (r-01  ' ' s+p  (r  -c )  +i.I t  [(a+r,)-  1r+i.)  (e+B)  I (0 - 0e)
+ [a(a+p  (r-a)+r,) - cp -  (a+a)  (r-F)  u] (g - S''))  . (10)
To  ensure  that  y  -  y  =  o  for  arbitrary  values  of  g  -  gf  alj.d d  -  0',  it  is
necessary  and  sufficient  that  A  = e/ (t  +  I)  andB=  r/(r  +  r) '  Note  that  A  +
B =  L when d  =  1  --i-e.,  when the  wealth  and  substitution  effects  of  a
productivity  shock  have  exactly  offsettj-ng  effects  on  the  suppfy  of  1abor.
Concluding  Remarks
rn  an  economy  wiEh  capital  investment,  movernents  in  d  will  reflecE
changes  in  lhe  capital  stock  as  well  as  changes  in  total  facEor  productivity.
Similarly,  movements  in  g  will  reflect  changes  in  investment  as  well  as
changes  in  government  purchases.  Consequently,  the  current  value  of  0  will
depend  upon  past  realizations  of  gr.  Also,  the  current  vaLue  of  9r will  depend
upon  today's  expectation  of  future  levels  of  total  factor  productivity,  future
real  output,  and  future  real  factor  prices.  Since  the  policy  derived  above
yields  the  same time  pathe  of  outpuE  and  real  factor  prices  as  a  market-
clearing  economy  for  any  given  time  path  of  g,  the  policy  remains  optimal  even
in  an  economy  with  investment.  In  such  an  economy,  however,  it  is  essential
that  agents  be  confident  that  the  policy  vritl  not  be  abandoned  in  the  future.
Results  derlved  above  extend  easily  to  an  economy  with  multi-period,
overlapping  contracts-  -provided  that  each  conxract  seLs  the  noney  wage  equaT
ta  its  expected  market-cTearing  7eve7,  period  by  period,  over  the  contract's
7ife,  In  lhis  case,  any  change  in  the  monetary  authority's  target  must  be
announced  far  enough  in  advance  fhau  all  existing  contracts  will  have  expired
before  the  change  lakes  effect.  If,  as  in  Taylor  (1980),  multi-period
contracts  specify  a  fixed  wage  leve]  (rather  than  a  wage  path)  ,  ot  if  prices
as  well  as  wages  are  "sticky,  "  then  the  analysis  presented  above  breaks  down.
More  generally,  results  presented  by  west  (1986)  suggest  that  conclusions
reached  here  are  tj-kely  sensiEive  to  alternative  specj-fications  of  the  aggre-gate  supply  equation,  expectations  forrnation,  and  policlmakers,  objectives.
Note,  finalLy,  that  labor  contracts  would  probably  move  away  from  the
simple  form  assumed  here  if  the  monetary  authority  insisted  upon  pursuing  a
rule  not  ful1y  efficient  given  those  contracts  (Fischer  L974,  p.  204).NOTES
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